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BOOK REviws
THE END OF OBSCENITY. By Charles Rembar. New York: Random
House, 1968. Pp. 528. $8.95.
The End of Obscenity was written, the author tells us, in "an at-
tempt to offer an insight, to those who are not a part of it, into how
our legal system works."' This slows the book considerably for the
legal reader,2 but should not dissuade him. It offers insights of other
sorts to lawyers and to law students, since it is one of those all-too-rare
books in which a lawyer unfolds the history of an important piece of
litigation. The book begins with the author's retention by Grove
Press in 1959 to defend Lady Chatterley's Lover3 and ends in 1966
with his successful defense of Fanny Hill4 for Putnam before the
Supreme Court. In between is the story of the Tropic of Cancer5 liti-
gation.
"The end of obscenity" is the author's victory cry. If a writer can
produce something not "utterly without value," he and his book are
now safe from obscenity prosecution. "That is the meaning of the
Fanny Hill case. So far as writers are concerned, there is no longer a
law of obscenity,"7 the author writes. The victory came, he observes,
with the opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan in Fanny Hill which "made
law of the 'value' theory,"" the goal which Rembar had set out to reach
some seven years before. True, only Mr. Justice Fortas and the Chief
Justice joined in the Brennan opinion, but Mr. Justice Stewart seemed
to accept the "value" theory under another tag and Mr. Justice Harlan
accepted it in federal cases. Finally, Justices Black and Douglas con-
curred as a result of their "absolute" position against obscenity pro-
secutions. "Whether there were three or four or five Justices who sub-
'C. REmBAR, THE END OF OBscENrrY 4 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
REMBAI.
2 Perhaps the most remarkable excursus occurs when the author discusses a
proceeding begun against FANNY HmLL under the N.Y. Camm. CODE § 22(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1954), which allowed proceedings for destruction of offending books.
The author notes the procedure was sustained in Kingsley Books v. Brown, 845
U.S. 486 (1957), with an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter likening the offending
books to "deodands of old." There follow several pages on the concept of
deodands with citation to the views of Blackstone and Holmes, after which the
author returns to FANNY HiL. RImAR at 227.3 D. LAWRENCE, LADY CHATTERLEY's LovER (1959 ed.). The book was
written in 1928 and never officially published in the United States until the
Grove Press edition, according to testimony in the case.4 J. CLELAND, FANNY HLi: MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE (1960
ed.). H Mnir, Tuopic OF CANcER t1961 ed.).
OA book named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. At-
torney General of Massachusetts, 888 U.S. 413 (1966).
7 REMAR at 490.8Id. at 480.
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scribed to the value theory, it was enough, so long as there were two
others who would forbid all suppression"9 the author concludes.
Roth v. United States'° had established a "two-level" approach to
first amendment speech. Obscenity, like libel and fighting words, was
not protected speech. The reason given was that obscenity is "utterly
without redeeming social importance." The lawyer's (Rembar's) job
was to establish the "converse" proposition; that if a book is not
utterly without redeeming social importance, it cannot be held obscene.
A book, obscene by the Roth test because "to the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest," might still be
protected if it has "redeeming social importance." At the hearing on
Lady Chatterley, testimony was introduced to establish the social im-
portance of the book and after an adverse decision by the Post-
master General, Judge Bryan of the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York reversed the order with a permanent in-
junction against the New York postmaster." The Court of Appeals
affirmed 12 and there the case ended, although Penguin Books was later
prosecuted in England for publishing a paper back edition.'3
In 1961, one year after the Lady Chatterley litigation ended, Grove
Press decided to publish Tropic of Cancer. Almost immediately sixty
court actions were ified against it. "Censorship by multiplicity of
litigation," 4 the author observes. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court upheld the publication of Tropic of Cancer and the decision was
not appealed to the Supreme Court. Other decisions, pro and con,
followed in New York, California, Wisconsin and Florida, until the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed summarily in Grove
Press v. Gerstein.15
The greater part of the book concerns the Fanny Hill litigation for
Putnam. The author was apparently involved at the planning stage
9 Id. at 481.
10 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
11 Grove Press v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
12 Grove Press v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
13 The decision turned on the book's morality, not on obscenity, and the
question put to the jury by the prosecutor in his opening address was whether
LADY CaHTAT inEY was a book ..... [y]ou would wish your wife or servants to read.
... [g]irls working in factories." 1aiA at 156. The jury verdict was not guilty.
Cf. RummR at 172-73, on the censorship of paperbacks. "... it is more than a
matter of protecting the common man against a prurience that the elite may be
permitted to enjoy. The censor's motivation goes deeper into a longing to preserve
the common man from the ravages of intellect."
14 Id. at 174.
15 378 U.S. 577 (1964). Five members of the court voted to reverse, citing
their opinions in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Four voted to deny
certiorari.
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and persuaded the publisher to caption the work, on the dust jacket, as
"The Classic Novel" rather than "A Literary Curiosity." 6 He was
soon involved in trials in New York, Boston, and Hackensack (New
Jersey). He considered Fanny Hill a more difficult book to defend
than Lady Chatterley or Tropic of Cancer-partly because it makes
sex attractive rather than disgusting and partly because of the bad
reputation it had accumulated through the centuries.
The author describes the three trials in considerable detail with long
verbatim excerpts, which prove most instructive and enlightening,
from the examination of witnesses. The problems of qualifying wit-
nesses and proving literary value by expert testimony are well illus-
trated, together with the difficulty of avoiding a "legal conclusion"
which would invade the function of the court. 1 The chapter on the
Massachusetts trial illustrates a devastating cross-examination of a
prep school head-master, put on the stand as a literary expert by the
state, who had failed to do his home-work.' 8 In the chapter on the
New Jersey trial, the cross-examination drew the witnesses into excess,
so that they ended up "making unsupported statements that were in-
herently improbable."' 9
Finally, the author got to the Supreme Court with Fanny Hill and
won a reversal of the Massachusetts decision against the book and the
acceptance of the "value" test.20 The appeal was complicated by an
amicus intervention by the American Civil Liberties Union and by
companion cases of Ginzberg v. United States2l and Mishkin v. New
York.22 The American Civil Liberties Union espoused the position that
obscenity could be suppressed only where there was a "clear and
present danger of harmful consequences." The author found two
practical objections to that argument. First, the required proof of clear
and present danger is unavailable and second, the court was not ready
to accept this line of reasoning.23
Mishkin and Ginzberg, unlike Putnam, were convicted of circu-
lating obscenity and their convictions were affirmed by the Supreme
Court. The author, as an attorney for reputable publishers, is con-
16 PRimm at 224.
17 See, e.g., RBmR at 254, 266, 275.
18 Id. at 317-25. There was a later opportunity to strike, but the author con-
cluded that the testimony of the hostile witness had done the defendant more
good than harm.
19 Id. at 344-94.
20 A book named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
21383 U.S. 413 (1966).
22383 U.S. 502 (1966).23 REmBmlr at 420-21.
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cerned with matters of literary value and wastes no sympathy on them.
He asserts that Mishkin's books are prurient trash, and that Ginzberg
was clearly pandering.24
In a closing chapter the author reflects briefly upon the world
beyond the end of obscenity. He suggests first that a scintilla of evi-
dence of value may not satisfy the "utterly without any value" test. The
value must be discernible and demonstrable and must pervade the
work-not just a few paragraphs. 25 Secondly, he suggests that other
media may also pose problems of invasion of privacy or public decency,
and that different results may follow from litigation involving these.
Perhaps obscenity law has been too preoccupied with erotic
effect, the appeal to prurient interest and the clear and present danger
of some unlawful act. Also at stake is an aesthetic interest and an
interest in privacy. As the author puts it:
ET]hat public things should be decent is not, intrinsically a bad idea.
Perhaps the orthodox libertarian will find the idea more acceptable if it
is put it. terms of aesthetics. Consider it a form of zoning .... In public,
a variety of rights run their course, and the traffic must be regulated.
Along with the right of privacy, there can be said to be a duty of
privacy.
2 6
Paul Oberst
Professor of Law
University of Kentucky
FmM CENSORS AND THE LAw. By Neville March Hunnings. New York:
Hilary House, 1968. Pp. 474. $12.50.
CENsoRsmrP OF THE MovEs: THE SOCIAL AND POIrnCAL CONTROL OF
A MAss MEDruM. By Richard S. Randall. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1968. Pp. xvi, 280. $7.95.
These two recently published volumes on film censorship provide a
number of contrasts. The Hunnings work is descriptive, with little
analysis; the Randall book contains much factual material thoroughly
analyzed. The former deals with several countries, the latter only with
the United States. The former is narrowly legal, while the latter deals
not only with the law but also with movies as a medium of com-
munication in a democratic society. Perhaps the largest difference is
24 Id. at 407-08, 428-34, 484-85.
251d. at 489.
261d. at 511.
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